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Abstract
We present a general technique for proving inapproximability results for several
paradigmatic truthful multi-dimensional mechanism design problems. In particular,
we demonstrate the strength of our technique by exhibiting a lower bound of 2− 1
n
for
the scheduling problem with n unrelated machines (formulated as a mechanism design
problem in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen on Algorithmic Mechanism Design).
Our lower bound applies to universally-truthful randomized mechanisms, regardless of
any computational assumptions on the running time of these mechanisms. Moreover, it
holds even for the wider class of truthfulness-in-expectation mechanisms. We then turn
to Bayesian mechanism design and show a lower bound of 1.2 for Bayesian Incentive
Compatible deterministic mechanisms. No lower bounds for truthful mechanisms in
multi-dimensional settings with randomness were previously known.
We then define the workload-minimization problem in networks. We prove our lower
bounds for this problem in the inter-domain routing setting presented by Feigenbaum,
Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker.
Finally, we discuss several notions of non-utilitarian fairness (Max-Min fairness,
Min-Max fairness, and envy minimization) and show how our technique can be used
to prove lower bounds for these notions. 1
1 Introduction
1.1 Inapproximability Issues in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Mechanism Design is a field of economic theory and game-theory that deals with designing
protocols for optimizing global goals that require interaction with selfish players [49, 57]. Al-
gorithmic Mechanism Design [54] combines an economic perspective that takes into account
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1The current paper supersedes an earlier version that appeared as an extended abstract in the Proceedings
of the 18th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA-07), pages 1143-1152, 2007. The
current version includes a new lower bound result for Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms.
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the strategic behaviour of the players, with a theoretical computer-science perspective that
focuses on aspects such as computational-efficiency and approximability.
Let us now describe, more formally, the nature of the problems that Algorithmic Mecha-
nism Design attempts to solve: There is a finite set of alternatives A = {a, b, c, ...}, and a set
of strategic players N = {1, ..., n}. Each player i has a valuation function vi : A → R that
is his private information. The players are self-interested and only wish to maximize their
own utility. The global goal is expressed by a social choice function f that assigns to every
possible n-tuple of players’ valuations (v1, ..., vn) an alternative a ∈ A. Mechanisms are said
to truthfully implement a social choice function if their outcome for every n-tuple of players’
valuations matches that of the social choice function, and if they enforce payments of the
different players in a way that motivates truthful report of their valuations (no matter what
the other players do). 2
A canonical social choice function is the utilitarian function. A utilitarian function aims
to maximize the social welfare, i.e., to find the alternative a ∈ A for which the expression
Σi vi(a) is maximized. Another paradigmatic social choice function is the Max-Min function
(based on the philosophical work of John Rawls [58]). For every n-tuple of vi valuations the
Max-Min function assigns the alternative a ∈ A that maximizes the expression mini vi(a).
Intuitively, the Max-Min function chooses the alternative a ∈ A in which the least satisfied
player has the highest value.
While in many computational and economic settings the social choice function we wish
to implement in a truthful manner is utilitarian, often this is not the case. Problems in
which the social choice function is non-utilitarian include revenue maximization in auctions
(e.g., [31]), minimizing the makespan in scheduling (e.g., [54, 2, 1, 20, 14]), fair allocation
of resources (e.g., [8, 7, 46]), etc. A classic result of mechanism design states that for
every utilitarian problem there exists a mechanism that truthfully implements it – namely,
a member of the celebrated family of VCG mechanisms [61, 15, 35]. No general technique
is known for truthfully implementing non-utilitarian social-choice functions. In fact, some
non-utilitarian social-choice functions cannot be truthfully implemented [8, 54]. Hence, it
is natural to ask how well non-utilitarian social choice functions can be approximated in a
truthful manner.
1.2 Our Results
In this paper we present and discuss a general technique for setting lower bounds on the
approximability of truthful mechanisms. We obtain the first lower bounds for canonical
non-utilitarian settings with randomness. Our technique is powerful in the following sense:
Firstly, due to its generality and simplicity it can easily be applied to a variety of problems
and notions of truthfulness (as we shall demonstrate). Secondly, it applies to the general case
2It is well known (e.g., [49]) that, without loss of generality, we can limit ourselves to only considering
direct-revelation truthful mechanisms. In such mechanisms participants are always rationally motivated to
correctly report their private information.
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of multi-dimensional settings. 3 Finally, it does not impose any computational assumptions
on the mechanism (such as polynomial running-time).
In Section 3 we present our technique and demonstrate its use on a non-utilitarian schedul-
ing problem. The single-dimensional version of this scheduling problem has received much
attention [2, 1, 20, 14] (and references therein). We deal with the multi-dimensional version
of the problem, formulated as a mechanism design problem by Nisan and Ronen in their
seminal paper on Algorithmic Mechanism Design [54]: The global goal is minimizing the
makespan of the chosen schedule. I.e., assigning the tasks to the machines in a way that
minimizes the latest finishing time. Obviously, the makespan-minimization social choice
function is non-utilitarian and hence might not be truthfully implemented by any mecha-
nism. Nisan and Ronen prove that not only is it impossible to minimize the makespan in
a truthful manner, but that any approximation strictly better than 2 cannot be achieved by
a truthful deterministic mechanism. Since a non-truthful (1 + ǫ)-approximation exists [37]
(assuming constant number of machines), this raises a natural question:
Can near-optimal (1+ǫ)-approximation truthfulmechanisms be achieved by using
randomization for multi-dimensional non-utilitarian settings?
Section 3 illustrates our technique by proving several lower bounds for this problem.
In particular, we prove that no universally-truthful randomized mechanism can achieve an
approximation ratio better than 2 − 1
n
. This nearly matches the known truthful upper
bound of 1.58606 for the case in which there are only two machines [10]. Surprisingly, this
lower bound applies even for the substantially weaker notion of truthfulness for randomized
mechanisms - truthfulness-in-expectation. We also show a lower bound of 1.2 for Bayesian In-
centive Compatible mechanisms (also known as Bayesian truthful mechanisms). This bound
applies to deterministic Bayesian mechanisms. These are the first lower bounds for multi-
dimensional settings with randomness. In fact, to the best of our knowledge these are the
first lower bounds for universally truthful mechanisms, truthful-in-expectation mechanisms
and Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanisms in multi-dimensional settings in general.
Hence, truthful (1 + ǫ)-approximation using randomization is ruled out for the
canonical unrelated machines problem (regardless of computational efficiency).
In addition, we show how to prove lower bounds for the important class of strongly-
monotone deterministic mechanisms. The strongly-monotone property [41] is essentially
similar to Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). Lavi et al. [41] show that
in several canonical domains this property can be assumed without loss of generality. This
natural property says that the social choice between two alternatives depends only on the
individual valuation difference between these two alternatives. 4 This is another step towards
3As opposed to single-dimensional settings in which the private information of each player essentially
consists of a single numerical parameter.
4Together with decisiveness, strong-monotonicity essentially implies affine maximization in general com-
binatorial auctions domains and multi-unit domains [41]. In several discrete domains (such as unrestricted
integer domains), strong-monotonicity is sufficient for truthful implementability, while weak-monotonicity is
not [52]. For a recent characterization of strongly-monotone scheduling mechanisms see [40].
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proving the long-standing conjecture of Ronen and Nisan that no truthful deterministic
mechanism can obtain an approximation ratio better than n.
In Section 4 we present another multi-dimensional non-utilitarian problem – minimizing
the workload in communication networks. This problem arises naturally in the design of
routing mechanisms. We study the approximability and inapproximability of this problem
in the inter-domain routing setting presented by Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and
Shenker [28].
Finally, in Section 5 we discuss three notions of non-utilitarian fairness – Max-Min fair-
ness, Min-Max fairness, and envy-minimization. We highlight the connections between these
notions and the problems studied in this paper and prove several general inapproximability
results.
1.3 Related Work
In a seminal paper Nisan and Ronen [54] introduced the field of Algorithmic Mechanism
Design. The main problem presented in [54] to illustrate the novelty of this new area of
research was scheduling with unrelated machines. Nisan and Ronen explored the approx-
imability of this non-utilitarian multi-dimensional problem and exhibited a lower bound of
2 − ǫ for truthful deterministic mechanisms. For this NP-hard scheduling problem there
exist an FPTAS [37] (assuming constant number of machines) and a polynomial-time 2-
approximation algorithm [45], that are both non-truthful. Additionally, this problem cannot
be approximated in polynomial-time within a factor of less than 3
2
[45].
In recent years Algorithmic Mechanism Design has been the subject of extensive study [55,
59]. A substantial amount of this research has focused on single-dimensional settings (see
e.g., [44, 3, 51, 31, 38]). Nearly-optimal truthful mechanisms were designed for the single-
dimensional problem of minimum makespan for scheduling tasks on related machines [2,
1, 20, 14]. The exploration of truthful mechanisms for multi-dimensional settings has ar-
guably mainly revolved around the problem of welfare maximization in Multiple-Object
auctions [16, 53], that has gained the status of the paradigmatic problem of this field. As
this is a utilitarian problem, it can be optimally and truthfully implemented by a VCG
mechanism. However, it has been shown that the social welfare in combinatorial auctions
cannot be maximized (or even closely approximated) in polynomial time [44, 56]. As algo-
rithmic mechanism design seeks time-efficient implementations, the main challenge faced by
researchers is devising truthful polynomial-time mechanisms that approximately maximize
the social welfare in combinatorial auctions [43, 23, 24, 6, 36, 21].
There are few inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms. This is particularly true
in multi-dimensional settings. Other than Nisan and Ronen’s 2−ǫ lower bound discussed pre-
viously, the following inapproximability results are known for combinatorial auctions: Lavi,
Mu’alem and Nisan [41] proved that no polynomial time deterministic truthful mechanism
for a multi-unit auction between two players that always allocates all units can achieve an ap-
proximation factor better than 2. Dobzinski and Nisan [22] proved inapproximability results
for polynomial-time VCG mechanisms for multi-unit auctions. Dobzinski and Vondra´k [26]
bound the power of polynomial-time universally-truthful randomized mechanisms in com-
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binatorial auctions with submodular valuations. Several papers use VC dimensionality to
prove inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auc-
tions [17] (and references therein). We contribute to this ongoing research by presenting
methods for deriving the first lower bounds for multi-dimensional non-utilitarian settings
that apply to truthful mechanisms with randomness. Our lower bounds do not require any
assumptions on the running-time of the mechanisms.
Our technique greatly relies on the work of Bikhchandani et al. [8]. They characterize
truthfulness in multi-dimensional settings by showing that any truthful deterministic mech-
anism must maintain a certain weak-monotonicity property. Using this characterization, [8]
manages to show that while welfare maximization can be truthfully implemented in combi-
natorial auctions, one cannot truthfully implement the Max-Min social choice function, even
in a very restricted type of combinatorial auctions. The weak-monotonicity property (and
several of its extensions) will play a major role in our inapproximability proofs.
Makespan in multi-parameter settings. Nisan and Ronen [54] present a truthful de-
terministic mechanism that obtains an n-approximation. They showed that no truthful
deterministic mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio strictly better than 2 (and
also strengthened this lower bound to n for two specific classes of deterministic mechanisms
whose payments satisfy some local properties) [54]. This lower bound has been improved
and extended in a series of results. Christodoulou et al. [13] showed a lower bound of 1+
√
2
for 3 machines. 5 Koutsoupias and Vidali [39] showed a lower bound of 1 + φ ≈ 2.618 for
truthful deterministic mechanisms with n→∞ machines (φ is the golden ratio). An optimal
lower bound of n for anonymous truthful mechanisms is shown in [4].
For the case of two machines, Lehmann, Nisan, and Ronen exhibit a universally-truthful
randomized mechanism that obtains an approximation of 7
4
[54]. This upper bound was later
improved to 1.6737 [48] and then improved to 1.58606 [10]. Dobzinski and Sundararajan show
that every mechanism in the support of any universally-truthful randomized mechanism for
two machines that obtains finite approximation ratio must be task independent [25]. That
is, the mechanism must assign each task separately from the others. 6
For Bayesian settings, Daskalakis and Weinberg [18] recently show that there is a poly-
nomial time 2-approximately optimal mechanism for makespan minimization for unrelated
machines. The approximation factor in this result is with respect to the optimal Bayesian
Incentive Compatible mechanism (rather than the optimal algorithm for makespan mini-
mization) and thus is not directly comparable with the lower bound presented in our paper.
Giannakopoulos and Kyropoulou show that the VCG mechanism achieves an approxi-
mation ratio of O( lnn
ln lnn
) when the processing times of the tasks are independent random
variables, identical across machines [33]. This essentially improves on the previously best
known bound of O(m
n
) given by Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan [9].
For fractional settings (where the mechanism is allowed to split the task across several
machines) Christodoulou et al. [11] present a truthful task-independent n+1
2
-approximation
5Gamzu [32] gives a considerably simpler alternative proof.
6See [62, 63] for further characterizations of scheduling mechanisms.
5
mechanism. To compliment this result they show a lower bound of 2 − 1
n
for any fractional
truthful mechanism. They gave a lower bound of n+1
2
for task-independent fractional truth-
ful mechanisms. Lu [47] gives a lower bound of 1.5625 for scale-free universally-truthful
randomized mechanism for two machines, where the allocation of tasks depends only on
relative costs, not on scale. Lavi and Swamy [42] and Yu [65] show truthful mechanisms in
a multi-dimensional scheduling special setting where the processing time of a task on each
machine is either ’low’ or ’high’.
In several interesting settings, truthful mechanisms are essentially equivalent to mech-
anisms that select envy-free allocations with the smallest supporting price vectors [19]. A
natural question to ask is whether envy-free pricing techniques can improve the current strik-
ing approximability and inapproximability bounds for truthful mechanisms. Mu’alem [50]
observed that the optimal envy-bounds are far apart from the optimal truthful bounds and
therefore concludes that envy-free bounding techniques cannot be applied straightforwardly
to tighten the striking randomized bounds for minimizing the makespan on two unrelated
machines.
In a follow-up work, Gamzu [32] improved our truthful lower bound for minimizing the
workload in inter-domain routing (from φ = 1+
√
5
2
≈ 1.618 to 2) and our universally-truthful
randomized lower bound (from 3+
√
5
4
≈ 1.309 to 2).
1.4 Open Questions
• We prove lower bounds for the scheduling problem with unrelated machines (see Sec-
tion 3) and for the workload-minimization problem in inter-domain routing (see Sec-
tion 4). In both problems, there are very large gaps between the known upper and
lower bounds for truthful mechanisms (deterministic and randomized). Narrowing
these gaps is an interesting long-standing open question.
• This paper did not make any computational assumptions on mechanisms. Proving
(possibly stronger) lower bounds for polynomial time truthful mechanisms is a big
open question.
1.5 The Organization of the Paper
In Section 3 we study several lower bounds on truthfulness of scheduling problem with un-
related machines. In Section 4 we study the problem of workload-minimization in networks.
In Section 5 we study several notions of non-utilitarian fairness.
2 Preliminaries
We consider the standard mechanism design setting: There are n players, and a finite set
of alternatives A. Each player i ∈ [n] has a private valuation function vi ∈ Vi that assigns
6
a non-negative real value to every a ∈ A (the higher the value of the alternative the more
desirable it is).
A (deterministic) mechanism M(f, p) consists of a deterministic social choice function
f : V → A (representing some global goal, e.g., makespan as defined below), and a payment
function pi : V → R for each player i. Each player i is simultaneously being asked to
report a valuation vi (possibly deviating from his private valuation), and the mechanism
then computes the outcome f(v) and charges price pi(v) to player i (notice that payment
might be negative or positive). The (quasi-linear) utility that player i derives by declaring
valuation v′i is vi(f(v
′
i, v−i))−pi(v′i, v−i) (assuming player i’s private valuation function is vi).
Each player aims to maximize his own utility.
A mechanism M(f, p) is called truthful if for every player i, for every v−i ∈ V−i, and for
every vi, v
′
i ∈ Vi,
vi(f(vi, v−i))− pi(vi, v−i) ≥ vi(f(v′i, v−i))− pi(v′i, v−i).
That is, a mechanism is truthful if no player can ever improve its utility by misreporting
his private valuation to the mechanism (no matter what the other players do).
Remark 1 The above setting refers to value scenarios where players report their valuations
to the mechanism and willing to maximize their values minus their payment to the mecha-
nism. In what follows we will mainly consider cost scenarios where players report their costs
(rather than valuations) to the mechanism and analogously are willing to minimize their
costs minus the payment made to them by the mechanism. We will slightly abuse notation
by letting vi refer both to a valuation function, and to a cost function, but the meaning will
be clear from the context.
The approximation ratio of a mechanism optimizing a global minimization goal (e.g.,
makespan) is defined to be the worst case ratio (over all possible valuations v ∈ V ) between
the goal value of the chosen alternative and the optimal value.
A universally-truthful randomized mechanism is a probability distribution over truthful
mechanisms. Formally, for every v ∈ V the universally-truthful randomized mechanism pro-
duces a distributionD(v) over deterministic truthful mechanisms and outputs a deterministic
mechanism drawn from this distribution.
A randomized social choice function f is a function from n-tuples of players’ valuations
to probability distributions over the set of alternatives A. A randomized mechanism consists
of a randomized social choice function f : V → A, and a payment function pi : V → R for
each player i. A randomized mechanism (f, p) is truthful-in-expectation if for every player i,
for every v−i ∈ V−i, and for every vi, v′i ∈ Vi,
E[vi(f(vi, v−i))− pi(vi, v−i)] ≥ E[vi(f(v′i, v−i))− pi(v′i, v−i)].
Thus, if a mechanism is truthful-in-expectation then the expected utility of a player is max-
imized when he declares his true private valuation vi (no matter what the other players
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do). Here, we assume risk neutral players aiming to maximize the expected difference be-
tween their true private valuation and their total payment (the expectation is taken over
any randomness in the mechanism).
The approximation ratio of a mechanism with randomness optimizing a global minimiza-
tion goal (e.g., makespan) is defined to be the worst case ratio (over all possible valuations
v ∈ V ) between the expected goal value of the chosen alternative and the optimal value.
In a Bayesian (a.k.a. stochastic) setting the private valuations of each player i is drawn
independently from Di. The product distribution D = D1×· · ·×Dn is assumed to be public
knowledge. We restrict our attention to deterministic mechanisms (with deterministic social
choice functions). A mechanism M(f, p) is Bayesian Incentive Compatible (given the public
knowledge distribution D) if for all i
Ev−i∼D−i [vi(f(vi, v−i))− pi(vi, v−i)] ≥ Ev−i∼D−i [vi(f(v′i, v−i))− pi(v′i, v−i)] .
That is, player i’s expected utility from reporting his true valuation vi is no less than his
expected utility from reporting a different valuation v′i when others’ true valuations are drawn
from the product distribution D−i. Here, we assume risk neutral players aiming to maximize
the expected difference between their true private valuation and their total payment (the
expectation is taken over the randomness in other players’ valuations). Thus, if a mechanism
is Bayesian Incentive Compatible then the expected utility of a player is maximized when
he declares his true private valuation vi (assuming all other players truthfully report their
valuations).
The approximation ratio of a Bayesian mechanism optimizing a global minimization goal
(e.g., makespan) is defined to be the ratio between the expected goal value of the chosen
alternative and the expected optimal value, where the expectations are taken over D.
3 A Presentation of Our Technique Via the Scheduling
Problem
In this section we present our technique and show how it can be used to derive lower bounds
for the scheduling problem with n unrelated machines. Nisan and Ronen [54] exhibited a
truthful n-approximation deterministic mechanism for this problem. Their mechanism is a
VCG mechanism, and can easily be shown to be strongly-monotone (see Subsection 3.2 for
a formal definition of strong-monotonicity). This mechanism can be viewed as auctioning
each task separately in a Vickrey auction. 7 It is straight forward to show that any VCG
mechanism with a deterministic tie-breaking rule among alternatives is strongly-monotone.
They also proved a lower bound of 2− ǫ for truthful deterministic mechanisms that applies
even when there are only two machines and is tight for this case. However, Nisan and
7Christodoulou et al. show that for two machines VCG is the unique mechanism achieving the optimal
approximation of 2 [12].
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Ronen [54] conjecture that their lower bound is not tight in general, and that any truthful
deterministic mechanism cannot obtain an approximation ratio better than n.
For the case of two machines, Nisan and Ronen show that randomness helps get an
approximation ratio better than 2. They present a universally-truthful randomized mech-
anism that has an approximation ratio of 7
4
. We generalize their result by designing a
universally-truthful randomized mechanism that obtains an approximation ratio of 7n
8
(see
Appendix A.1).Thus, we prove that randomness achieves better performances than the known
truthful deterministic n upper bound for any number of machines. In Subsection 3.2 we show
ways of proving lower bounds for truthful deterministic mechanisms. Using these methods
we provide a simple and shorter proof for Nisan and Ronen’s 2 − ǫ lower bound. Our
proof (unlike the original) relies on exploiting the weak-monotonicity property defined in [8].
Subsection 3.2 also aid us in deriving a stronger lower bound for the important classes of
strongly-monotone deterministic mechanisms. We note, that the mechanism in [54], which is
the best currently known deterministic mechanism for the scheduling problem, is contained
in this class. We prove that no approximation ratio better than n is possible for this class
of strongly-monotone deterministic mechanisms (thus making another step towards proving
the long-standing conjecture of [54]).
After discussing lower bounds for truthful deterministic mechanisms we turn our atten-
tion mechanisms with randomness. There are two possible definitions for the truthfulness of
a randomized mechanism [24, 54]. The first and stronger one is that of universal truthfulness
that defines a truthful randomized mechanism as a probability distribution over truthful
deterministic mechanisms. Thus, this definition requires that for any toss of the random
coins made by the mechanism, the players still maximize their utility by reporting their
true valuations. A considerably weaker definition of truthfulness is that of truthfulness-in-
expectation. This definition only requires that players maximize their expected utility, where
the expectation is over the random choices of the mechanism (but still for every behaviour
of the other players). Unlike universally truthful mechanisms, truthful-in-expectation mech-
anisms only motivate risk-neutral bidders to act truthfully. Risk-averse bidders may benefit
from strategic behaviour. In addition, truthful-in-expectation mechanisms induce truthful
behaviour only as long as players have no information about the outcomes of the random
coin flips before they need to act.
In Subsection 3.3 we prove the first lower bound on the approximability of universally-
truthful randomized mechanisms in multi-dimensional settings. Namely, we show that any
universally-truthful randomized mechanism for the scheduling problem cannot achieve an
approximation ratio better than 2 − 1
n
. This lower bound nearly matches the universally
truthful 1.58606 upper bound for the case of two machines [10]. To prove this lower bound,
we make use of a general technique that is based on Yao’s powerful principle [64]. Our
proof for the 2− ǫ lower bound for deterministic mechanisms (in Subsection 3.2) serves as a
building block in the proof of this lower bound.
In Subsection 3.4 we strengthen this result by proving that the same lower bound holds
even when one is willing to settle for truthfulness-in-expectation. Our proof relies on some of
the ideas that appear in the proof of the previous lower bound but takes a different approach.
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In particular, we generalize the weak-monotonicity requirement to fit the class of truthful
randomized mechanisms, and explore the implications of this extended monotonicity on the
probability distributions over allocations generated by such mechanisms.
In Subsection 3.5 we turn to the notion of Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanisms,
where players’ valuations are drawn from a distribution that is public knowledge, and show
a lower bound of 1.2 for deterministic Bayesian mechanisms.
3.1 The Setting
We consider the standard unrelated strategic machines setting [54]: There are m tasks that
are to be assigned on n machines, where each task must be assigned to exactly one machine.
Every machine i is a strategic player with an arbitrary valuation function vi : 2
[m] → R+
such that vi({j}) (or vi(j), for short) denotes the private cost of task j ∈ [m] on machine i.
One can think of the private cost of task j on machine i as the time it takes i to complete
j. For every subset of tasks S ⊆ [m], vi(S) = Σj∈S vi(j). That is, the total cost of a set of
tasks on machine i is the sum of the costs of the individual tasks on that machine. Each
machine wishes to minimize the cost of the set of tasks assigned to it minus the payment
made to it by the mechanism. If the mechanism is truthful then machine i can never improve
its utility by misreporting its private cost function vi to the mechanism (no matter what the
other machines do).
The set of alternatives A contains all possible allocations of tasks to the machines, where
all tasks must be assigned, and each task is assigned to exactly one machine. The global
goal is minimizing the makespan of the chosen allocation. I.e., find an allocation of tasks
a ∈ A to minimize the expression
max{v1(a1), . . . , vn(an)}.
3.2 Lower Bounds for Truthful Deterministic Mechanisms
Bikhchandani et al. [8] formally define the weak-monotonicity property for deterministic
mechanisms: Consider an Algorithmic Mechanism Design setting with n strategic players.
Before we present the formal definition we will require the following
Definition 1 Let M be a deterministic mechanism. Let i ∈ [n] and let v = (v1, ..., vn) be
an n-tuple of players’ valuations. Let v′i be a valuation function. Denote by a the alternative
that M outputs for v and by b the alternative that M outputs for (v′i, v−i). The mechanism
M is said to be weakly monotone if for all such i, v, and v′i it holds that:
vi(a) + v
′
i(b) ≥ v′i(a) + vi(b).
Remark 2 This definition of weak-monotonicity is for value scenarios in which each player
wishes to maximize the difference between his valuation and his total payment. In cost
scenarios in which players have costs (such as the scheduling of unrelated machines problem,
the workload minimization problem, and the min-max fairness considered in this paper) the
inequality is in the other direction.
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Bikhchandani et al. [8] prove that any truthful deterministic mechanism must be weakly-
monotone. For completeness, we present this simple proof.
Lemma 1 Any truthful deterministic mechanism must be weakly-monotone.
Proof: LetM be a truthful deterministic mechanism. Let i ∈ [n] and let v = (v1, ..., vn) be
an n-tuple of players’ valuations. Let v′i be a valuation function. Denote by a the alternative
thatM outputs for v and by b the alternative thatM outputs for (v′i, v−i). Consider player i.
It is well known that the price a player is charged by the mechanism to ensure his truthfulness
cannot depend on the player’s report. Specifically, the payment of player i in a and b is a
function of v−i and of a and b, respectively. We denote by pi(v−i, a) and by pi(v−i, b) i’s
payment in a and b, respectively. It must hold that vi(a)− pi(v−i, a) ≥ vi(b)− pi(v−i, b) (for
otherwise, if i’s valuation function is vi, he would have an incentive to declare his valuation
to be v′i). Similarly, v
′
i(b) − pi(v−i, b) ≥ v′i(a) − pi(v−i, a). By adding these two inequalities
we reach the weak-monotonicity requirement.
Relying on the weak-monotonicity property we provide an alternative proof for the 2− ǫ
lower bound of [54] for the scheduling problem with unrelated machines. Our proof shows
that any deterministic mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio better than 2 violates
the weak-monotonicity property.
Theorem 1 Any weakly-monotone mechanism cannot achieve an approximation ratio better
than 2.
Proof: Let ǫ be an arbitrarily small positive real number. Consider the scheduling
problem with two machines and three tasks. For every machine i = 1, 2 we define two
possible valuation functions vi and v
′
i:
vi(t) =
{
1 t = i or t = 3
100 otherwise
v′i(t) =


0 t = i
1 + ǫ t = 3
100 otherwise.
Let M be a deterministic, weakly-monotone, mechanism that achieves an approximation
ratio better than 2. Then, when players 1 and 2 have the valuations v1 and v2 respectively,
M must assign task 1 to player 1, task 2 to player 2, and can choose to which player to
assign task 3 (because the optimal makespan is 2 and any other assignment results in a
makespan of at least 100). W.l.o.g. assume that M assigns task 3 to player 2. Now,
consider the instance with players’ valuations (v′1, v2). Notice that the only task-allocation
that guarantees an approximation ratio better than 2 is assigning tasks 1 and 2 to players
1 and 2 respectively, and task 3 to player 1. However, this turns out to be a violation of
the weak-monotonicity requirement. Weak-monotonicity, in this case, dictates that for every
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player i = 1, 2 it must hold vi(a) + v
′
i(b) ≤ v′i(a) + vi(b). However, if we look at player 1 we
find that 1 + (1 + ǫ) = v1(1) + v
′
1({1, 2}) > v′1(1) + v1({1, 2}) = 2. A contradiction.
Lavi et al. [41] present and study another property – strong-monotonicity. They show that
in some canonical domains this property can be assumed without loss of generality. Strong-
monotonicity is the strict version of weak-monotonicity (Definition 1). It says essentially that
the social choice between two alternatives depend only on the individual valuation difference
between these two alternatives.
Definition 2 Let M be a deterministic mechanism. Let i ∈ [n] and let v = (v1, ..., vn) be
an n-tuple of players’ valuations. Let v′i be a valuation function. Denote by a the alternative
that M outputs for v and by b the alternative that M outputs for (v′i, v−i). The mechanism
M is said to be strongly monotone if for all such i, v, and v′i it holds that: If a 6= b, then
vi(a) + v
′
i(b) > v
′
i(a) + vi(b).
Here, too, the inequality is in the other direction if players have costs rather than values.
We prove that no member of the class of strongly-monotone mechanisms can obtain an
approximation better than n for the scheduling problem (even for the case of zero/one
valuations). The idea at the heart of our proof of Theorem 2 is an iterative use of the
strong-monotonicity property to construct an instance of the problem for which the allocation
generated by the mechanisms is very far from optimal.
Theorem 2 Any strongly-monotone mechanism cannot obtain an approximation ratio better
than n.
Proof: Consider an instance of the scheduling problem with n machines and m = n2
tasks. Let M be a deterministic mechanism for which the strong-monotonicity property
holds. Let I be the instance of the scheduling problem in which every machine i has a
valuation function vi such that vi(j) = 1 for all j ∈ [m]. Denote by S = (S1, ..., Sn) the
allocation of tasks produced by M for the instance I. It must be that there is some machine
r such that |Sr| ≥ n. Without loss of generality let r = n.
We will now create a new instance I1 by altering the valuation function of machine 1
to v′1 while leaving all the other valuation functions unchanged (in case S1 = ∅ we skip this
part). That is, machine 1 will have the valuation function v′1:
v′1(t) =
{
0 t ∈ S1
1 t /∈ S1
and every other machine i 6= 1 will have a valuation function vi. Denote by T = (T1, ..., Tn)
the allocation M generates for I1. The first step of the proof is showing that S1 = T1. This
is guaranteed by the strong-monotonicity ofM . Assume, by contradiction that S1 6= T1. The
strong-monotonicity property ensures that v1(S1) + v
′
1(T1) < v1(T1) + v
′
1(S1). By assigning
values we have:
|S1|+ |T1 \ S1| < |T1|+ 0.
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Observe, that |S1|+ |T1 \ S1| − |T1| = |S1 \ T1|, therefore:
|S1 \ T1| < 0.
A contradiction.
We shall now prove that not only does S1 equal T1, but in fact Si = Ti for every i. Since
S1 = T1 it must be that v1(S1)+v
′
1(T1) = v
′
1(S1)+v1(T1). However, the strong-monotonicity
property (with respect to (v1, v−1) and (v′1, v−1)) dictates that if this is true then S = T .
In an analogous manner we shall now turn the valuation function of machine 2 into v′2
while keeping all the other valuation functions in I1 unchanged (in case S2 = ∅ we skip this
part). That is, the valuation function of machine 2 is changed into:
v′2(t) =
{
0 t ∈ S2
1 t /∈ S2.
Similar arguments show that the allocation produced by the M for this new instance will
remain S. We can now iteratively continue to change the valuation functions of machines
3, ..., n− 1 into v′3, ..., v′n−1 respectively, without changing the allocation the mechanism gen-
erates for these new instances. After performing this, we are left with an instance in which
every machine i ∈ [n − 1] has the valuation function v′i, and machine n has the valuation
function vn. We have shown that the allocation generated byM for this instance is S. Recall
that |Sn| ≥ n. Fix some R ⊆ Sn such that |R| = n. We will now create a new instance In
from the previous one by only altering the valuation function vn into the following valuation
function v′n:
v′n(t) =
{
0 t ∈ Sn \R
1 otherwise.
By applying similar arguments to the ones used before, one can show that the allocation
generated by M when given the instance In remains S. Observe that the finishing time of
S for In is n because all the tasks in R are assigned to machine n. Also notice that the
finishing time of the optimal allocation of tasks for In is precisely 1 (by assigning the i’th
task in R to machine i, for i = 1, ..., n). The theorem follows.
3.3 A Lower Bound for Universally-Truthful Randomized Mech-
anisms
We now present a technique for deriving lower bounds for universally truthful mechanisms,
based on Yao’s principle [64]. Consider a zero-sum game with two players. Let the row
player’s strategies be the various different instances of a specific problem, and let the column
player’s strategies be all the deterministic truthful mechanisms for solving that problem. Let
entry gij in the matrix G depicting the game be the approximation ratio obtained by the
algorithm of column j when given the instance of row i.
Recall that every universally-truthful randomized mechanism is a probability distribution
over deterministic truthful mechanisms. The straight-forward approach for proving a lower
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bound for such mechanisms is to find an instance of the problem on which every such
mechanism cannot achieve (in expectation) a certain approximation factor. By applying the
well known Minimax Theorem to the game described above we get that an alternate and just
as powerful way for setting lower bounds is to show that there is a probability distribution
over instances on which any deterministic mechanism cannot obtain (in expectation) a certain
approximation ratio.
We demonstrate this technique by proving a 2 − 1
n
lower bound for universally truth-
ful mechanisms for the scheduling problem. Our proof is based on finding a probability
distribution over instances of the scheduling problem for which no deterministic truthful
mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than 2 − 1
n
. To show this, we shall
exploit the weak-monotonicity property of truthful deterministic mechanisms (as discussed
in Subsection 3.2).
Theorem 3 Any universally truthful mechanism cannot achieve an approximation ratio bet-
ter than 2− 1
n
.
Proof: Let ǫ be an arbitrarily small positive real number. Consider the scheduling problem
with n machines and m = n+1 tasks. For every machine i we define two possible valuation
functions:
vi(t) =
{
1 t = i or t = n+ 1
4
ǫ
otherwise
and
v′i(t) =


0 t = i
1 + ǫ t = n+ 1
4
ǫ
otherwise.
Let I be the instance in which the valuation function of every machine i is vi. For
every j, let Ij be the instance in which every machine i 6= j has the valuation function vi,
and machine j has the valuation function v′j. We are now ready to define the probability
distribution P over instances: instance I is assigned probability ǫ, and for every j instance
Ij is picked with probability 1−ǫ
n
.
We now need to show that any deterministic truthful mechanism M cannot achieve an
approximation ratio better than 2− 1
n
on P . Let T j be the allocation of the n+1 tasks to the
n machines in which every machine i gets task i, and machine j is also assigned task n+ 1.
Observe, that T j is the optimal allocation of tasks for the instance Ij . Also observe, that
while the finishing time of the allocation T j for the instance Ij is 1 + ǫ, the finishing time
of any other allocation of tasks is at least 2. We shall denote the allocation that M outputs
for the instance I by M(I). Similarly, we shall denote the allocation that M outputs for
the instance Ij by M(Ij) (for every j ∈ [n]). We will now examine two distinct cases: The
case in which M(I) 6= T r for any r ∈ [n], and the case that M(I) = T r for some r ∈ [n].
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Observe, that in the first case the finishing time is at least 4
ǫ
while the optimal finishing
time is 2. Since instance I appears in P with probability ǫ we have that M ’s expected
approximation ratio is at least
4
ǫ
× ǫ+ (1 + ǫ)× (1− ǫ)
2× ǫ+ (1 + ǫ)× (1− ǫ) > 2−
1
n
.
We are left with the case in which M(I) = T r for some r ∈ [n]. Consider an instance Ij
such that j 6= r. The following lemma states that M will not output the optimal allocation
for Ij (that is, T j).
Lemma 2 If M(I) = T r for some r ∈ [n], then for every j 6= r M(Ij) 6= T j.
Proof: Let j 6= r. Let us assume by contradiction that M(Ij) = T j. The weak-
monotonicity property dictates that vj(j) + v
′
j({j, n + 1}) ≤ v′j(j) + vj({j, n + 1}). By
assigning values we have that 1 + (1 + ǫ) ≤ (1 + 1), and reach a contradiction.
From Lemma 2 we learn that if M(I) = T r (for some r ∈ [n]) then we have that M(Ij)
(for every j 6= r) is an allocation that is not the optimal one (i.e., not T j). In fact (as
mentioned before), any allocation that M outputs given Ij will have a finishing time of
at least 2, while the optimal allocation (T j) has a finishing time of 1 + ǫ. The expected
approximation ratio of M for P is therefore at least
2 · (n−1)·(1−ǫ)
n
+ (1 + ǫ) · 1−ǫ
n
+ 2ǫ
(1 + ǫ) · (1− ǫ) + 2ǫ ≥
(2− 1
n
) · (1− ǫ)
(1 + ǫ) · (1− ǫ) + 2ǫ
Since limǫ→0
(2− 1
n
)·(1−ǫ)
(1+ǫ)·(1−ǫ)+2ǫ = 2− 1n , the theorem follows.
3.4 A Lower Bound for Mechanisms that are Truthful-in-Expectation
After handling the case of universally truthful mechanisms we now turn to the weaker notion
of truthfulness-in-expectation. Any such mechanism can be regarded as a mechanism that
for every instance of a problem produces a probability distribution over possible alternatives.
In this subsection we consider risk neutral players with quasi-linear utility functions.
We start by generalizing the weak-monotonicity definition. We consider the expected
value with respect to a distribution over the set of alternatives A:
Definition 3 Let v be a valuation function. We define the extended valuation function Vv
as follows. For every probability distribution P over the set of alternatives A
Vv(P ) = Σa∈A PrP [a]× v(a).
Arguments similar to those of Lemma 1 show that randomized mechanisms that are
truthful-in-expectations must be weakly monotone (given the new definition of the valuation
functions). This extended weak-monotonicity is equivalent to themonotonicity-in-expectation
property defined by Lavi and Swamy [43].
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Definition 4 Let M be a randomized mechanism. Let i ∈ [n] and let v = (v1, ..., vn) be an
n-tuple of players’ valuations. Let v′i be a valuation function. Denote by P the distribution
over alternatives that M outputs for v and by Q the distribution over alternatives that M
outputs for (v′i, v−i). The mechanism M is said to be weakly monotone in the extended sense
if for all such i, v, and v′i it holds that: Vvi(P ) + Vv′i(Q) ≥ Vv′i(P ) + Vvi(Q).
Lemma 3 (Lavi and Swamy [43]) Any truthful-in-expectation mechanism must be weakly-
monotone in the extended sense.
We can exploit this extended definition of weak-monotonicity to prove inapproximability
results. We show how this is done by strengthening our 2 − 1
n
lower bound for universally-
truthful randomized mechanisms by showing that it applies even for the case of truthfulness-
in-expectation.
A key element in the proof of Theorem 4 is the observation that instead of regarding a
randomized mechanism for the scheduling problem as generating probability distributions
over allocations of tasks, it can be regarded as generating, for each task, a probability
distribution over the machines it is assigned to by the mechanism. This different view of a
randomized mechanism for this specific problem, enables us to better analyse the contribution
of each task to the expected makespan.
The main lemma in the proof of Theorem 4, namely Lemma 4, makes use of this fact
together with the extended weak-monotonicity condition. Lemma 4 essentially proves that
for two carefully chosen instances of the problem, the probability that a specific task is
assigned to a specific machine in one of the instances, cannot be considerably higher than the
probability it is assigned to the same machine in the other. Thus, we show that even though
allocating this task to that machine in one of the instances leads to a good approximation,
any truthful-in-expectation mechanism will fail to do so.
Theorem 4 Any mechanism that is weakly-monotone in the extended sense cannot achieve
an approximation ratio better than 2− 1
n
.
Proof: Let ǫ be an arbitrarily small positive real number. Consider the scheduling problem
with n machines and m = n+1 tasks. For every machine i we define two possible valuation
functions:
vi(t) =
{
1 t = i or t = n+ 1
4
ǫ2
otherwise
(1)
and
v′i(t) =


0 t = i
1 + ǫ t = n+ 1
4
ǫ2
otherwise.
(2)
Let I be the instance in which the valuation function of every machine i is vi. For every
j ∈ [n] let Ij be the instance in which every machine i 6= j has the valuation function vi,
and machine j has the valuation function v′j . Let T
j be the allocation of the n + 1 tasks to
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the n machines in which every machine i gets task i, and machine j is also assigned task
n+ 1.
LetM be a mechanism that is weakly-monotone in the extended sense. We shall denote by
P the distribution over all possible allocations produced byM when given instance I, and by
P j the distribution over all possible allocationsM produces when given instance Ij . Let R be
some distribution over the possible allocations. Fix a machine i and a task t, we define pi,t(R)
to be the probability that machine i gets task t given R. Formally, pi,t(R) = Σa|t∈ai PrR[a].
Observe that Vvi(R) = Σt∈[m] pi,t(R)vi(t) and Vv′i(R) = Σt∈[m] pi,t(R)v
′
i(t).
We are now ready to prove the theorem. In order to do so, we prove that for every
mechanism M , as defined above, one can find an instance of the scheduling problem for
which M fails to give an approximation ratio better than 2− 1
n
. Consider instance I.
If pi,i(P ) < 1−ǫ2 (for some i ∈ [n]) then machine i does not get task i with probability of
at least ǫ2. However, when machine i does not get task i, the finishing time of a schedule for
I cannot be less than 4
ǫ2
, while the optimal finish time is 2. Therefore, with probability of at
least ǫ2 the makespan of the algorithm is at least 4
ǫ2
. If this is the case, the approximation
ratio is at least 2 (and the theorem follows). Hence, from now on we will only deal with the
case in which for every i ∈ [n],
pi,i(P ) ≥ 1− ǫ2.
Let r be some machine such that pr,n+1(P ) ≤ 1n (recall that Σi∈[n] pi,t(P ) = 1 for every
task t ∈ [m]). Intuitively, r is a machine that is hardly assigned task n+ 1 in P .
We will show that in this case we can choose the instance Ir to prove our lower bound.
The main idea of the proof is showing that machine r will not be assigned task n + 1 in P r
with probability that is significantly higher than the probability it was assigned the task in
P .
Lemma 4 Let r be some machine such that pr,n+1(P ) ≤ 1n . It holds that pr,n+1(P r) ≤ 1n + ǫ.
Proof: As M is weakly-monotone in the extended sense (and since this is a cost scenario)
we have that Vvr(P ) + Vv′r(P
r) ≤ Vv′r(P ) + Vvr(P r). That is:
Σt∈[m] pr,t(P )vr(t) + Σt∈[m] pr,t(P r)v′r(t) ≤
Σt∈[m] pr,t(P )v′r(t) + Σt∈[m] pr,t(P
r)vr(t).
After subtracting identical terms from both sides we have:
pr,r(P )vr(r) + pr,n+1(P )vr(n+ 1) + pr,r(P
r)v′r(r) + pr,n+1(P
r)v′r(n+ 1) ≤
pr,r(P )v
′
r(r) + pr,n+1(P )v
′
r(n+ 1) + pr,r(P
r)vr(r) + pr,n+1(P
r)vr(n+ 1)
By (1) and (2) we have:
pr,r(P ) + pr,n+1(P ) + pr,n+1(P
r)× (1 + ǫ) ≤ pr,n+1(P )× (1 + ǫ) + pr,r(P r) + pr,n+1(P r)
Therefore:
pr,r(P ) + pr,n+1(P
r)× ǫ ≤ pr,n+1(P )× ǫ+ pr,r(P r)
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Because pr,r(P ) ≥ 1− ǫ2 and pr,r(P r) ≤ 1 we have:
(1− ǫ2) + pr,n+1(P r)× ǫ ≤ pr,n+1(P )× ǫ+ 1
Equivalently, pr,n+1(P
r) ≤ pr,n+1(P ) + ǫ.
We next show that M fails to provide an approximation ratio better than 2 − 1
n
for Ir.
The optimal allocation for Ir is T r, which has a finishing time of 1+ ǫ. Any other allocation
has a finishing time of at least 2. However, with high probability T r is not reached by M ,
since pr,n+1(P
r) ≤ 1
n
+ ǫ, and since machine r gets task n+1 in T r, we know the probability
that M outputs T r is at most 1
n
+ ǫ. The expected approximation ratio of M is therefore at
least
( 1
n
+ ǫ)× (1 + ǫ) + (1− ( 1
n
+ ǫ))× 2
1 + ǫ
≥ (2− 1
n
) · 1− ǫ
1 + ǫ
Since limǫ→0 1−ǫ1+ǫ = 1, the theorem follows.
3.5 A Lower Bound for Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mecha-
nisms
We now turn to the notion of Bayesian mechanisms, where players’ valuations are drawn
from a distribution that is public knowledge. We show a lower bound of 1.2 (even for two
machines and three tasks). No lower bound for Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanisms
in multi-parameter settings was previously known. In what follows, we restrict our attention
to deterministic mechanisms that deterministically output an allocation (in particular, for
any given input each task will be always deterministically allocated to the same machine).
Theorem 5 Any Bayesian Incentive Compatible deterministic mechanism cannot achieve
an approximation ratio strictly better than 1.2.
Proof: Let ǫ be an arbitrarily small positive real number. Consider a setting with two
machines and three tasks (the generalization for n > 2 is straightforward). We define a
product distribution with two possible equally likely valuation functions vi and v
′
i for every
machine i = 1, 2 (notice that the processing times of the tasks are not identical across
machines):
vi(t) =
{
1 t = i or t = 3
4
ǫ
otherwise
and
v′i(t) =


0 t = i
1 + ǫ t = 3
4
ǫ
otherwise.
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Assume by contradiction that there exists a deterministic Bayesian Incentive Compatible
mechanism M with an expected approximation ratio 1.2−δ for some δ > 0. We shall denote
the allocation that M outputs for the instance I by M(I).
Let T j be the allocation of the tasks to machines in which task i is assigned to machine i,
and task 3 is assigned to machine j (where i, j ∈ {1, 2}). Notice that M(v1, v2),M(v′1, v′2) ∈
{T 1, T 2} since for any allocation that gives the first task to the second machine or the second
task to the first machine we have
1
4
· 4
ǫ
+ 3
4
· (1 + ǫ)
1
4
· 2 + 3
4
· (1 + ǫ) > 1.2− δ.
Now, T 1, T 2 are optimal for the instances (v′1, v2), (v1, v
′
2), respectively. Furthermore,
we must have that M(v′1, v2) = T
1,M(v1, v
′
2) = T
2 under the assumption that an expected
approximation ratio strictly better than 1.2 can be achieved. More formally, observe that
the finishing time of any other allocation of tasks is at least 2, and clearly for a small enough
ǫ we have
2
4
· 2 + 2
4
· (1 + ǫ)
1
4
· 2 + 3
4
· (1 + ǫ) > 1.2− δ.
Without loss of generality assume that M(v1, v2) = T
2. By symmetry it is enough to
consider two cases: M(v′1, v
′
2) = T
1 and M(v′1, v
′
2) = T
2.
In the first case we have that M(v1, v2) = M(v1, v
′
2) = T
2,M(v′1, v2) = M(v
′
1, v
′
2) = T
1.
Recall that the probability that the valuation function of machine 2 is v2 (or v
′
2) is
1
2
. By
Bayesian incentive compatibility (with respect to player 1) we have that (for the case where
the valuation function of player 1 is v1):
1
2
(p1(v1, v2)−v1(T 2))+ 1
2
(p1(v1, v
′
2)−v1(T 2)) ≥
1
2
(p1(v
′
1, v2)−v1(T 1))+
1
2
(p1(v
′
1, v
′
2)−v1(T 1)).
By Bayesian incentive compatibility (with respect to player 1) we have that (for the case
where the valuation function of machine 1 is v′1):
1
2
(p1(v
′
1, v2)−v′1(T 1))+
1
2
(p1(v
′
1, v
′
2)−v′1(T 1)) ≥
1
2
(p1(v1, v2)−v′1(T 2))+
1
2
(p1(v1, v
′
2)−v′1(T 2)).
By adding up these two inequalities and cancelling out the payments from both sides we
have that v1(T
1) + v′1(T
2) ≥ v1(T 2) + v′1(T 1). A contradiction (since 2 + 0 < 1 + (1 + ǫ)).
We are left with the case in which M(v1, v2) = M(v1, v
′
2) = M(v
′
1, v
′
2) = T
2, M(v′1, v2) =
T 1. By Bayesian incentive compatibility we have that
1
2
(p1(v1, v2)−v1(T 2))+ 1
2
(p1(v1, v
′
2)−v1(T 2)) ≥
1
2
(p1(v
′
1, v2)−v1(T 1))+
1
2
(p1(v
′
1, v
′
2)−v1(T 2)),
and
1
2
(p1(v
′
1, v2)−v′1(T 1))+
1
2
(p1(v
′
1, v
′
2)−v′1(T 2)) ≥
1
2
(p1(v1, v2)−v′1(T 2))+
1
2
(p1(v1, v
′
2)−v′1(T 2)).
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Equivalently,
1
2
(p1(v1, v2)− v1(T 2)) + 1
2
p1(v1, v
′
2) ≥
1
2
(p1(v
′
1, v2)− v1(T 1)) +
1
2
p1(v
′
1, v
′
2),
and
1
2
(p1(v
′
1, v2)− v′1(T 1)) +
1
2
p1(v
′
1, v
′
2) ≥
1
2
(p1(v1, v2)− v′1(T 2)) +
1
2
p1(v1, v
′
2).
By adding up these two inequalities and rearranging we have that v1(T
1) + v′1(T
2) ≥
v1(T
2) + v′1(T
1). A contradiction (since 2 + 0 < 1 + (1 + ǫ)).
4 Workload Minimization in Inter-Domain Routing
In this section, we study another non-utilitarian multi-dimensional problem – workload min-
imization in inter-domain routing. Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker formu-
lated the inter-domain routing problem as a distributed mechanism design problem [28] (in-
spired by the extensive literature on the real-life problem of inter-domain routing in the Inter-
net). Several works that study their model and its extensions have been published [27, 29, 30].
All these works deal with the realization of utilitarian social-choice functions, and focus on
the efficient and distributed design of VCG mechanisms.
Workload minimization is a problem that arises naturally in the design of routing pro-
tocols, as we wish that no single Autonomous System (AS) will be overloaded with work.
It can easily be shown that any VCG mechanism performs very poorly with respect to
workload minimization. Thus, while optimally minimizing the total cost, or maximizing
the social welfare, the known truthful mechanisms for this problem can result in workloads
that are very far from optimal (in which one AS is burdened by the traffic sent by all other
ASes). We initiate the study of truthful workload minimization in inter-domain routing by
presenting constant lower bounds that apply to any truthful mechanism (deterministic and
randomized).
4.1 The Setting
We are given a directed graph G = 〈N,L〉 (called the AS graph) in which the set of nodes
N corresponds to the Autonomous Systems (ASes) of which the Internet is comprised. The
set N consists of a destination node d, and n source nodes (see Example 1 below). The set
of edges L corresponds to communication links between the ASes. Each source node i ∈ [n]
is a strategic player. The number of packets (intensity of traffic) originating in source node
i and destined for d is denoted by ti. The directed graph G and number of packets tis are
public knowledge.
Let neighbours(i) be all the ASes that are directly linked to i in the AS graph. Each
source node i has a private cost function ci: neighbours(i)→ R+ that specifies the per-packet
cost incurred by this node for carrying traffic. This cost function represents the additional
load imposed on the internal AS network when sending a packet from i to an adjacent AS. In
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the formulation of the problem in [28], a node does not incur a cost for packets that originate
in that node. However, since we are interested in workload minimization, this is not the case
in our formulation. Additionally, as we are interested in proving lower bounds we can restrict
our attention to the model in which the number of packets tis are public knowledge. If the
mechanism is truthful then player i can never improve its utility by misreporting his private
cost function ci to the mechanism (no matter what the other players do). In the single-
dimensional version of this problem an AS i incurs the same per-packet private cost ci for
sending traffic to each of its neighbours.
The set of alternatives A contains all possible route allocation that form a confluent tree
to the destination d. I.e., no source node is allowed to transfer traffic to two adjacent nodes.
We seek truthful mechanisms that output routing trees in which the workload imposed on
the busiest source node is minimized. Formally, let NTi be the set of all nodes whose paths
in the routing tree T go through node i. Let sT (i) be the subsequent node i transfers traffic
to in the routing tree T . The global goal is to minimize the expression
maxi Σj∈NT
i
tj × ci(sT (i))
over all possible routing trees T . Each source node i is a strategic player who wishes to
minimize his workload (= Σj∈NT
i
tj × ci(sT (i))) minus the payment made to him by the
mechanism. If the mechanism is truthful then player i can never improve its utility by
misreporting his private cost function ci to the mechanism (no matter what the other players
do).
Remark 3 It is easy to verify that the single-dimensional related machine scheduling makespan
minimization problem [2] is a special important case of the of the single-dimensional workload
minimization problem (furthermore, from any c-approximation truthful mechanism for work-
load minimization one can construct a c-approximation truthful mechanism for makespan
minimization). However, the problem of multi-dimensional workload minimization is strate-
gically different from the multi-dimensional unrelated machine scheduling makespan mini-
mization problem that we study in Section 3 (e.g., since ti is a public information and the
cost ci is a function of the direct successor nodes rather than the direct predecessor nodes).
x1
1 + ǫ 0
01 + ǫ
y
z
d
Figure 1:
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Example 1 Consider the routing instance in Figure 1. Each source node has a single packet
it wishes to send to the destination. The number beside every directed link (u, v) in the figure
represents the cost u incurs for transferring a packet to v. Consider the routing tree in which
both y and z send packets through x, and x forwards packets directly to d. The workload on
x is 3 in this routing tree. In the optimal routing tree all source nodes chose to send their
packets directly to d. This routing tree has a maximal workload of 1 + ǫ.
4.2 Approximability of the Single-Dimensional Case
It is easy to show (via a simple reduction from Partition) that even the single-dimensional
version of the workload-minimization problem is NP-hard. However, is it at all possible
to optimally solve this problem in a truthful manner? The answer to this question is yes.
However, the worst-case running time is exponential (we note that this is also the case in
the single-dimensional version of machine-scheduling [2]).
Lemma 5 There exists a truthful, deterministic, exponential-time mechanism that always
finds a workload-minimizing route allocation in the single-dimensional case.
Proof: The mechanism M simply goes over all possible route allocations and outputs
the optimal one with respect to workload-minimization. As in [2], our truthful mechanism
outputs the lexicographically-minimal optimal route allocation. Specifically, let a and b be
two distinct optimal route allocations (if two such allocations exist). Let a1, ..., an be a
decreasing order of the the number of packets that go through each of different nodes in a
(using a deterministic tie-breaking rule). Similarly, let b1, ..., bn be decreasing order of the
the number of packets that go through each of different nodes in b. Let j ∈ [n] be the first
index such that aj 6= bj or j = n if no such index exists (notice that the sorted order of the
coordinates of a might be identical to the sorted order of the coordinates of b, even if a 6= b).
The mechanism will choose a if aj < bj , b if bj < aj , and otherwise according to a predefined
deterministic tie-breaking rule.
We next show the truthfulness of the mechanism. It is well known that a mechanism is
truthful in a single-dimensional setting such as ours if and only if it is weakly-monotone [2].
Let a be the route allocation thatM outputs when the per-packet cost of i is ci, and the per-
packet costs of the other nodes are c−i = c1, ..., ci−1, ci+1, ..., cn. Let b be the route allocation
that M outputs when the per-packet cost of i is c′i, and the per-packet costs of the other
nodes are c−i. Weak-monotonicity states that if ci < c′i then ki ≥ k′i, where ki and k′i are
the number of packets that go through i in a and b, respectively (and this is true for every
node i, for every vector of costs per-packet c−i of the other nodes, and for every two costs
per-packet ci 6= c′i).
Fix a node i. Assume, by contradiction, that there are ci < c
′
i, and c−i such that ki < k
′
i.
Let a1, ..., an and b1, ..., bn be defined as before. Let c = (ci, c−i), c′ = (c′i, c−i). We shall use
the notation W(a, c) to denote the maximum workload of a player in the route allocation a
when the per-packet costs are c = (c1, c2, ..., cn) (that is, W(a, c) = maxi Σj∈NT
i
tj×ci(sa(i))).
Similarly, W(b, c) denotes the maximum workload of a player in the route allocation b when
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the per-packet costs are c = (c1, c2, ..., cn). The terms W(a, c
′) and W(b, c′) are defined
analogously. By the optimality of M it is immediate to verify that:
W(a, c) ≤W(b, c) ≤W(b, c′) ≤W(a, c′) (3)
W(a, c′) = max{W(a, c), kic′i} (4)
k′ic
′
i ≤W(b, c′) (5)
By (4) it suffices to consider two cases:
Case 1: W(a, c′) = W(a, c). From (3) we have
W(a, c) = W(b, c) = W(b, c′) = W(a, c′).
Now, W(a, c) = W(b, c) dictates that a comes before b in the lexicographic order (since a is
the (lexicographically) optimal route allocation at c), and W(b, c′) = W(a, c′) dictates that
b comes before a in the lexicographic order (since b is the (lexicographically) optimal route
allocation at c′), a contradiction.
Case 2: W(a, c′) = kic′i. From (3) and (5) we have k
′
ic
′
i ≤ W(b, c′) ≤ W(a, c′) = kic′i,
contradicting our assumption that k′i > ki.
4.3 Approximability of the Multi-Dimensional Case
Feigenbaum et al. [28] present a truthful polynomial-time VCG mechanism that always
outputs the cost-minimizing tree (a tree that minimizes the total sum of costs incurred
for the packets sent to d). We begin our discussion on the multi-dimensional version of
the workload minimization problem by showing that this VCG mechanism obtains an n-
approximation for the multi-dimensional version of our problem (and hence also for the
single-dimensional version) in polynomial time.
Theorem 6 There is a truthful polynomial-time deterministic n-approximation mechanism
for the workload minimization problem in inter-domain routing.
Proof: We prove that any mechanism that minimizes the total cost provides an n-
approximation to the minimal workload. Hence, the mechanism of [28] obtains the required
approximation ratio.
Suppose the per packet costs are c = (c1, ..., cn). Denote by T the corresponding cost-
minimizing routing-tree and by T ∗ the corresponding workload-minimizing routing-tree. Let
C(T, c) and C(T ∗, c) be the total costs of T and T ∗, respectively. Recall that W (T ∗, c) is
the value of the optimal solution for the workload-minimization problem. The result now
follows immediately from C(T ∗, c) ≤ n ·W (T ∗, c) and C(T, c) ≥W (T ∗, c).
Unfortunately, it can be shown that any mechanism that minimizes the total cost (and
in particular the mechanism in [28]) cannot obtain a better approximation ratio.
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Theorem 7 Any mechanism that minimizes the total cost of the routing tree cannot achieve
an approximation ratio strictly better than n for the workload minimization problem in inter-
domain routing.
Proof: Recall the routing instance in Figure 1. Observe, that any total-cost minimizing
mechanism would choose the routing tree in which both y and z send packets through x,
and x forwards packets directly to d. This means that the workload on x is 3. However, if
all nodes chose to send their packets directly to d we would reach a maximum workload of
1 + ǫ. Clearly, the example in Figure 1 can be generalized to n source nodes. Notice also
that a similar example can be used to show that the theorem holds for singe-dimensional
problems. The idea is to replace the link (y, d) with the links (y, y′), (y′, d) and the link (z, d)
with (z, z′), (z′, d) while cy(y, y′) = cz(z, z′) = 0, and cy′ = cz′ = 1 + ǫ assuming x, y, z have
each a single packet to send, and y′, z′ have no packets to send to the destination.
Therefore, there exists a trade-off between the goal of minimizing the total-cost and the
goal of minimizing the workload. It would be interesting to construct a truthful mechanism
that optimizes (or at least closely approximates) the minimal workload. We present two
negative results for this problem in Appendix A.2. In a follow-up work, Gamzu [32] improved
our truthful lower bound for minimizing the workload in inter-domain routing from 1+
√
5
2
≈
1.618 to 2, and our universally-truthful randomized lower bound from 3+
√
5
4
≈ 1.309 to 2.
5 Non-Utilitarian Fairness
Utilitarian functions represent the overall satisfaction of the players, as they maximize the
sum of players’ values. This notion of fairness is but one of several that have been considered
(explicitly and implicitly) in mathematical, economic and computational literature. A well
known example of non-utilitarian fairness is the cake-cutting problem, presented by the Polish
school of mathematicians in the 1950’s (Steinhaus, Banach, Knaster [60]). Fair allocations
of indivisible items have also been studied [41, 46] (these can be regarded as discrete versions
of the cake-cutting problem).
In this section, we discuss three general notions of non-utilitarian fairness – Max-Min
fairness, Min-Max fairness, and envy-minimization. We show that Max-Min fairness is inap-
proximable within any ratio, even for extremely restricted special cases. In sharp contrast, we
show that Min-Max fairness (which is a generalization of both the scheduling and workload-
minimization problems considered in this paper) can always be truthfully approximated via
a simple VCG mechanism. Finally, we make use of our technique to prove a lower bound for
the envy-minimization problem.
5.1 The Setting
In this setting we have m indivisible items and n strategic players. Each player i is defined
by a private valuation function vi : 2
[m] → R+. We assume that vi(∅) = 0 (free disposal),
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and vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) (monotonicity) for every i and every two sets of items S, T ⊆ [m] such
that S ⊆ T.
Each player wishes to maximize the value of the set of items assigned to it minus its
payment to the mechanism. If the mechanism is truthful then player i can never improve its
utility by misreporting his private valuation function vi to the mechanism (no matter what
the other players do). The set of alternatives A contains all possible allocations of items
to the players, where all items must be assigned, and each item is assigned to exactly one
player. The global goal of each of our three notions of non-utilitarian fairness – Max-Min
fairness, Min-Max fairness, and envy-minimization – will be defined below.
5.2 Max-Min Fairness
The global goal. The Max-Min social choice function is concerned with maximizing the
value of the least satisfied player. Formally, for every n-tuple of vi valuations the Max-Min
function assigns the alternative a ∈ A that maximizes the expression mini vi(a).
The Max-Min fairness allocation problem is based on the philosophical work of John
Rawls [58]. Lavi et al. [41] proved that Max-Min fairness in allocations of indivisible items
cannot be optimally implemented in a truthful manner. Non-truthful algorithms for this
problem were designed [5], as well as algorithms that settle for restricted notions of truth-
fulness [7, 34]. We prove that no truthful deterministic mechanism can obtain any approxi-
mation ratio to the Max-Min fairness value. We prove this lower bound even for the case of
2 players and 2 items.
Theorem 8 No truthful deterministic mechanism can obtain any approximation to the Max-
Min fairness value in the allocation of indivisible items. This holds even for the case of 2
players and 2 items.
Proof: Let c > 1 and let ǫ be an arbitrarily small positive real number. Consider an
instance with two players i = 1, 2 and two goods ga, gb. Each player i has an additive
valuation function. Let
v1(ga) = 2, v1(gb) =
1
c
v2(ga) = 4− ǫ, v2(gb) = 1 + ǫ.
Note, that the optimal allocation assigns ga to player 1 and gb to player 2, thus obtaining
a Max-Min value of 1 + ǫ. Also note, that this allocation will also be chosen by any c-
approximation mechanism.
We alter the valuation of player 2 into v′2 such that v
′
2(ga) =
1
c
, v′2(gb) =
1
c2
− ǫ. The
optimal Max-Min value is now 1
c
. Observe that any c-approximation mechanism must assign
gb to player 1 and ga to player 2. However, if this happens we have that:
(1 + ǫ) +
1
c
= v2(gb) + v
′
2(ga) < v2(ga) + v
′
2(gb) = (4− ǫ) +
1
c2
− ǫ.
This violates weak-monotonicity, and so no truthful c-approximation mechanism exists.
Since this is true for any c > 1 the theorem follows.
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5.3 Min-Max Fairness
The global goal. Min-Max fairness can be thought of as the dual notion of Max-Min
fairness. It is relevant in settings in which each player incurs a cost for every chosen alterna-
tive. 8 The Min-Max social choice function is concerned with minimizing the cost incurred by
the least satisfied player. Formally, for every n-tuple of vi valuations the Max-Min function
assigns the alternative a ∈ A that minimizes the expression maxi vi(a).
Observe, that both the scheduling problem and the workload-minimization problem dis-
cussed in this paper, are in fact special cases of this notion of fairness. Studying Max-Min
fairness in this more abstract setting enables us to state this simple observation – any Min-
Max social-choice function can be truthfully approximated within a factor of n (recall that
n is the number of players) by a simple VCG mechanism. Since the best currently known
approximation-mechanisms for both scheduling and workload-minimization are VCG-based,
this result can be viewed as a generalization of both.
Theorem 9 Let f be a Min-Max social choice function. Then, there exists a truthful de-
terministic mechanism that for every n-tuple of valuations v1, ..., vn outputs an alternative
a ∈ A such that maxi vi(a) is an n-approximation to the value of the solution f outputs for
these valuations.
Proof: Let v1, ..., vn be the valuation function of the players. Let b be the allocation that
f outputs for v1, ..., vn. Consider the VCG mechanism that minimizes the total cost the
players incur. The truthfulness of this mechanism is guaranteed by the VCG technique. Let
a ∈ A be the allocation that this mechanism outputs. The result now follows immediately
from maxi vi(a) ≤ Σi vi(a) and the fact that maxi vi(b) ≥ 1n · Σi vi(a).
5.4 Envy-Minimization
The global goal. Lipton, Markakis, Mossel, and Saberi [46] presented the problem of envy-
minimization for indivisible items. They consider truthful mechanisms for this problem. An
envy-minimizing allocation of items is a partition of the m items into disjoint sets S1, ..., Sn
(player i is assigned Si) that minimizes the expression maxi,j {vi(Sj) − vi(Si), 0} (over all
possible allocations). Intuitively, we wish to minimize the maximal envy a player might feel
by comparing his value for a set of items given to another player to the value he assigns the
items allocated to him.
They prove several approximability results for this problem. The parameter considered
in [46] is the maximal marginal utility.
Definition 5 The maximal marginal utility α is defined as follows:
α(v1, ..., vn) = max
i∈[n], j∈[m], S⊆[m]
vi(S ∪ {j})− vi(S).
8Here each player wishes to minimize the cost of the set of items assigned to it minus the payment made
to it by the mechanism.
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That is, α is the maximal value by which the value of a player increases when one item
is added to his bundle.
Lipton et al. [46] exhibit a universally-truthful randomized mechanism that has an envy of
at most O(
√
αn
1
2
+ǫ) w.h.p. for large values of n. They show that no truthful mechanism can
guarantee an optimal solution with respect to envy minimization. We strengthen this lower
bound by showing that no truthful deterministic mechanism can guarantee an allocation
that has an envy value within α from optimal.
Theorem 10 Any truthful deterministic mechanism cannot obtain an approximation ratio
better than α for envy minimization.
Proof: Assume for contradiction that there exists a truthful deterministic mechanism M
that α-approximates the envy minimization problem. Consider an instance with 2 players
and 3 items. Each player i = 1, 2 has the same additive valuation function vi that assigns
any of the single items a value of 1. Observe, that α(v1, v2) = 1. Notice, that the minimal
envy for this instance is 1. 9 Hence, if M assigns all items to one of the players the envy is
precisely 3 > 1 = α(v1, v2) · 1. Therefore, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the α-approximation
mechanism M allocates items 1, 2 to player 1 and item 3 to player 2 (call this partition
(S1, S2)).
Let ǫ be an arbitrarily small positive real number. We now change the valuation function
of player 1 into the following additive valuation:
v′1(j) =
{
1 + ǫ j = 1, 2
ǫ j = 3.
Now α(v′1, v2) = 1 + ǫ. Also observe that the minimal envy for this new instance is ǫ
(e.g., assign item 1 to player 1 and items 2, 3 to player 2). However, it is easy to verify that
weak-monotonicity dictates that the allocation remains the same even after the alteration
of the valuation of player 1 (since for any partition (T1, T2) 6= (S1, S2) of the items we have
that v′1(T1) − v1(T1) < v′1(S1) − v1(S1) = 2ǫ). Therefore, we end up with an allocation in
which the envy is 1 > (1 + ǫ) · ǫ = α(v′1, v2) · ǫ, a contradiction.
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A Appendix
A.1 A Universally-Truthful Randomized Approximation Mecha-
nism for the Scheduling Problem with Unrelated Machines
Nisan and Ronen [54] present a truthful deterministic mechanism that obtains an n-approximation.
For the case of 2 machines, they exhibit a universally-truthful randomized mechanism that
obtains an approximation of 7
4
(this bound was later improved to 1.58606 by [10]). We gener-
alize this result by presenting a universally-truthful randomized mechanism that obtains an
approximation-ratio of 7n
8
. We now turn to the description of our mechanism for n machines:
Input: An n-tuple of valuations (v1, ..., vn) and m tasks.
Output: An allocation T = T1, ..., Tn of tasks, and payments p1, ..., pn such that T has
a makespan value which is a 7n
8
-approximation to the optimal makespan value, and the
payments induce truthfulness.
The Mechanism:
1. For every machine i let Ti ← ∅ and pi ← 0.
2. Partition the set of machines into two sets S1 ← {1, ..., n2} and S2 ← {n2 + 1, ..., n}.
3. For each task j = 1, ..., m perform the following actions (assuming that min and argmin
break ties arbitrarily):
• Let v1 ← mini∈S1 vi(j), and let i1 ← argmini∈S1 vi(j).
• Let v′1 ← mini∈S1\{i1} vi(j).
• Let v2 ← mini∈S2 vi(j), and let i2 ← argmini∈S2 vi(j).
• Let v′2 ← mini∈S2\{i2} vi(j).
• Randomly and uniformly choose a value R ∈ {0, 1}.
• If R = 0 and v1 ≤ 4
3
v2 set Ti1 ← Ti1
⋃ {j} and set pi1 ← pi1 +min{v′1, 43v2}.
• If R = 0 and v1 > 4
3
v2 set Ti2 ← Ti2
⋃ {j} and set pi2 ← pi2 +min{v′2, 34v1}.
• If R = 1 and v2 ≤ 4
3
v1 set Ti2 ← Ti2
⋃ {j} and set pi2 ← pi2 +min{v′2, 43v1}.
• If R = 1 and v2 > 4
3
v1 set Ti1 ← Ti1
⋃ {j} and set pi1 ← pi1 +min{v′1, 34v2}.
4. Allocate each machine i the tasks in Ti, and pay it a sum of pi.
Remark 4 If n cannot be divided by 2 simply add the extra machine to either S1 or S2.
Theorem 11 There exists a universally-truthful randomized mechanism for the scheduling
problem that obtains an approximation ratio of 7n
8
.
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Proof: We prove the theorem for the case that n can be divided by 2. The proof for
the other case is similar. Our proof relies on the proof of Nisan and Ronen [54]. Observe,
that the utility of each machine after the algorithm finishes is the sum of its utilities for the
different tasks. Hence, it is sufficient to prove that for each individual task a machine has no
incentive to lie. As in [54], this is guaranteed because the allocation of each task is in fact a
weighted VCG mechanism (see [54] for further explanations), which is known to be truthful.
Hence, this mechanism is universally truthful.
We now need to prove that the approximation ratio guaranteed by the mechanism is
indeed 7n
8
. Let I be an instance of the scheduling problem with m tasks, and with n
machines that have the valuation functions v1, ..., vn. We define an instance I ′ of scheduling
problem with m tasks, and with 2 machines that have the valuation function v′1, v
′
2, in the
following way: v′1(j) = mini∈S1 vi(j) for all j ∈ [m]. Similarly, v′2(j) = mini∈S2 vi(j) for all
j ∈ [m]. We denote by M(I) and by M(I ′) the makespan values our mechanism generates
for I and I ′ respectively. We denote by OPT (I) and by OPT (I ′) the optimal makespan
values for I and I ′ respectively.
First, notice that M(I) ≤ M(I ′). This is because applying our mechanism to I ′ results
in the same makespan value as applying it to I in the worst-case scenario in which tasks are
always assigned to the same machines in S1 and in S2. It also holds thatM(I ′) ≤ 74OPT (I ′)
because in the case that there are only two machines our mechanism is precisely that of [54],
which guarantees a 7
4
approximation ratio. We now have that M(I) ≤ 7
4
OPT (I ′). All that
is left to show is that OPT (I ′) ≤ n
2
OPT (I). Consider the optimal allocation of tasks for I.
By giving all tasks assigned to machines in S1 to machine 1 in I ′, and allocating all tasks
assigned to machines in S2 to machine 2 in I ′, we end up with a makespan value for I ′ that
is at most n
2
OPT (I). The theorem follows.
A.2 Lower Bounds for minimizing the workload in inter-domain
routing
Theorem 12 No truthful deterministic mechanism for minimizing the workload in inter-
domain routing can obtain an approximation ratio better than 1+
√
5
2
≈ 1.618.
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Figure 2: The Instance I
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Figure 3: The Instance I ′
Proof: This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. To prove the lower bound consider
the instances of the workload-minimization problem with 3 source nodes x, y, z depicted in
Figures 2 and 3. Each source node has a single packet it wishes to send to the destination.
The number beside every directed link (u, u′) in these figures represents the cost u incurs for
transferring a packet to u′. Denote the instance in Figure 2 by I and the instance in Figure
3 by I ′. Observe that only the cost function of node x is different in I and I ′. We denote
the cost function of x in I by cx and his cost function in I ′ by c′x.
Assume, by contradiction, that M is a truthful deterministic mechanism that obtains
an approximation ratio better than φ = 1+
√
5
2
. Observe, that for the instance I M must
direct the traffic originating in node x through node y (otherwise this contradicts the fact
that M obtains an approximation ratio better than φ). Similarly, for the instance I ′ M
must direct the traffic originating in node x through node z. However, this violates the
weak-monotonicity of M as 1 + φ = cx((x, y)) + c
′
x((x, z)) > cx((x, y)) + c
′
x((x, z)) = φ
2 − ǫ
(since φ is the golden ratio).
Theorem 13 No universally-truthful randomized mechanism for minimizing the workload
in inter-domain routing can obtain an approximation ratio better than 3+
√
5
4
≈ 1.309.
Proof: We define I and I ′ as in the proof of Theorem 12. Consider the uniform distribution
over I and I ′. Let M be a truthful deterministic mechanism. As shown in the proof of
Theorem 12,M cannot achieve an approximation better than 1+
√
5
2
on both I and I ′ due to its
weak-monotonicity. Therefore, the expected approximation ofM is at least 1
2
×1+ 1
2
× 1+
√
5
2
≈
1.309.
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